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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

THE BACKGROUND OF INSTRUMENTALISM[1]

WE are learning to be at home in the world, not by misrepresenting it, but by understanding it. It is the passing of the supernatural, the liberation of the mind from its fetters of the past, and the recognition of our real problems and of our resources for handling them.

Our notion of a real objective world, with its own physical nature, its own natural laws, its own principles of cause and effect that we must learn before we can use, all this conception of nature that seems to us so simple and so normal, has been slowly and painfully acquired. Our remote ancestors lived in a world, peopled, by man's imagination, with hosts of supernatural beings. Their presence was felt—the presence of unseen powers—as many people to-day feel the presence of mysterious forces if they are in unfamiliar woods after dark. Some people never get over this fear of the dark. It is very probable that the Latin word, *religio,* meant originally this primitive feeling of anxiety in the presence of the unknown and the unpredictable.

Anyone can read how our ancestors lived in this sort of a world, where ghosts and gods constantly demanded sacrifice and propitiation. Trees and rivers had their indwelling spirits, groves and mountain-tops were the homes of deities. If a tribe settled down on a piece of land, it was important that the gods of that place should be made friendly. And as in early society a stranger is always an enemy, a god must be treated as one of the tribe. So a house was built for him called a temple, and the people and their gods, now become friendly and protecting powers, though capricious, dwelt together in the city. To offend the god was to endanger the public and collective interests; what one did with respect to the

[1] This paper was read six years ago at a meeting of a philosophical club in New York. Professor Dewey's *Essays in Experimental Logic* had just appeared, and the reader at the preceding meeting had made that volume the subject of his paper. In the discussion that followed, it seemed to me that there was not enough recognition of the circumstances that gave "instrumentalism" its particular character and importance. It happened to be my duty to present the next paper to the club. Various things in it I have said in print since then, and I beg the reader's pardon for what may seem like faded repetitions.

gods was of the greatest consequence, because that affected what the gods might do. What anyone believed or thought, was of no importance whatever. Religious rites were all-important, religious creeds were of no account.

This sense of nature, animate with unseen presences, is, of course, the origin of religion, and it is called animism. It has produced much of the loveliest art and literature of the world. It has provided symbols and figures in which the poetic and the moral imagination of the race has been expressed. Demeter is as fine a symbol of tenderness as Mary. Apollo is as fine an ideal of young manhood as St. George. The old churches of Italy are eloquent of what animism gave the world. Their dim frescoes tell us of what the faithful once believed literally and devoutly. A fine mythology is a great achievement, and fine races, like the Greek, the Chinese, and the Italian, will have mythologies full of poetry and quick imagination. But mythology remains mythology, and its roots are in the animism of primitive life.

Supernaturalism has yielded slowly but steadily to naturalism. Agriculture is no longer a religious affair. Law is not religious; we look ahead and not backward. All this passing of the supernatural is the passing of animism and the emancipation of the mind from a conception of the world that is full of poetry, but which gives us no leverage upon the world to make it more civilized and propitious.

Take, now, the point of view of the mind that has discovered what animism is, and is at last free to face, understand, and use the world of facts; what kind of philosophy and what kind of problem will the emancipated intelligence regard as important? As Mr. Santayana has put it, it will be a philosophy that looks to science for its view of the facts and to the happiness of men on earth for its ideals. It will view the mind as a power of guidance and control. Knowing will be the exercise of this guidance among the perplexities of natural living, thinking will be the work of solving the problems that naturally occur, of changing a state of affairs where one does not know how to proceed into a state of affairs where one can go ahead again. This point of view has been given the name "Instrumentalism," and it is the latest thing in the American philosophy that has escaped from animism and the supernatural. James had this conception of the mind and its activities and Professor Perry has phrased it in a way that I must quote. James studied "man the organism, saving himself and asserting his interests within the natural environment . . . the mind is not a mirror which passively reflects what it chances to come upon. It initiates and tries. . . . The mind like an antenna, feels the way for the organism. It gropes about, advances and recoils, making many random efforts and

many failures; but it is always urged into taking the initiative by the pressure of interest, and doomed to success or failure in some hour of trial when it meets and engages the environment. Such is mind, and such, according to James, are all its operations. These characters, interest, activity, trial, success, and failure, are its generic characters when it is observed concretely; and they are the characters which should take precedence of all others in the description of every special undertaking of mind such as knowing, truth-getting, and believing."[2]

You see how much this conception of the mind differs from the conception illustrated by saying it is like a mirror or a wax-tablet. Such illustrations suggest that the mind is a purely passive thing that beholds or contemplates either blissfully or miserably, but does nothing. But when philosophy is brought back from the clouds of animistic speculation to the earth of lumpy facts and difficulties where we really live and move and have our being, we see, as both Dewey and Santayana have said, that the ultimate categories of the mind are success and failure, and that what the mind is primarily for is to attain the one and to avoid the other.

It is worth noting that those that take this instrumental point of view use the word "intelligence" instead of the old word "thought." And it is evident that the old psychology of introspection must give way, and is giving way, to the psychology of behavior.

The wax-tablet conception of the mind is found in the famous sentence of John Locke (Bk. IV, ch. 1): "Since the mind in all its thoughts and reasonings hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them." Now it is fair to suppose that Locke meant this statement to express a simple empirical point of view, and to say that all opinions about facts must be grounded in experience,—the mind can not know anything it doesn't get at and come in contact with, therefore philosophy must not be based on authority or revelation, or go in for any doctrine of innate ideas. But the effect of this statement of Locke's was quite the other way. If you can know only ideas, then it seemed to follow you can not know things. So when people said "yes" to Locke, for they were glad to get rid of authority and be free to know their own ideas, and when they said, "Well what then?", what was taken to be the logical consequence was subjectivism, idealism, and a return to an animistic theory of reality.

But suppose we again make Locke's statement, and ask "What then?" The answer should be, "Well, let's look at the mind's im-

[2] *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, pp. 350–351.

pressions and ideas and see what they amount to, and how they work. Let's see how the mind behaves." The statement of Locke is an invitation to empiricism quite as much as to dialectics. But Locke's followers, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, did not think of that.

There is, in the chief work of Avenarius, a striking figure to illustrate his point of view. It is, he says, "the one that Greek tradition recommended to the philosopher: he stands in the front of the market-place, not, however, as a buyer or a seller, but as a spectator of the thronging life; he travels through distant lands and mingles with strange people, not for the sake of business, but rather for the sake of observation only.[3] Well, what then? When we ask that, we ask what he sees in the market-place and on his travels: we want an empirical report, not a dialectical inference. And here you see again that the seen world can be reported empirically, but the unseen can not be reported empirically. And you remember dialectic is not an existential science. All this is only to remind you of how the wax-tablet theory misled philosophy for a long time. The only way to know about the mind is to watch it at work. Professor Dewey's way of describing how the mind works is the latest thing in the movement I am describing, so I shall attempt a brief sketch of his account. How would our Greek traveller have described people he found engaged in thinking?

To return, then, to the point of view proposed by Avenarius: What are some striking features presented by the busy hour of the agora, or by the interior of the Grand Central station, or by the street outside, or by any office room where there is business to be done? Is it not a spectacle of energetic and busy people, occupied with various kinds of business of various degrees of importance? If some one asks whether these people ever think, any one can answer that probably each one thinks now and then. Many people do not think except when they have to, they do it reluctantly and painfully. Very eager and spontaneous young people shy away from any invitation to think because the operation is so disagreeable, checking, as it does, and dispersing the movement of youthful energy that is so delightful.

We can not, however, imagine a human being that never thinks; every one thinks now and then, every one thinks when he has to. Many of us may think when we don't have to, and this is a point that instrumentalism tends to neglect, and it is to be expected that a point of view called instrumentalism would not be concerned with the superfluous, the useless, the accidental.

Continuing the rough and empirical description of active people that do not think all the time, but do think when they have to, they

[3] *Kr. d. Reinan Erfahrung*, I, p. 10.

can be observed, when they do think, to pause, hesitate, and manifest symptoms of uncertainty. And no one of us would be surprised to see the symptoms of uncertainty, the manner of indecision, disappear and be replaced by symptoms of confidence, evidences of renewed purpose, phenomena of consistently directed activity. To the curious spectator, thinking is an episode in the conduct of business, an episode that must occur whenever the enterprise in hand becomes precarious. This has all been so completely described in Professor Dewey's various essays that repeating it seems entirely superfluous. Still let me complete the repetition. In anything deserving the name of business, the consequences of error are so lamentable that the capacity to think well is part of the capacity to successfully perform. Where the alternative is success or failure, and the factors in the situation are threatening to get out of hand, thinking is imperative. One can always point out to college students from families of the decidedly well-to-do that such young people have small chance really to think at all. Since nothing that is theirs is in a precarious state, all their lines of activity are defined without ambiguity. But where activity has to be the kind of activity we call thinking, correct judgment means success and wrong judgment means failure. Success and failure are, as Dewey says, the fundamental categories, and a philosopher rejoicing in phraseology's old and long since emptied bottles might announce that the categorical imperative of behavior is "so judge that the affairs considered may be treated with justified decision and your purpose prosper thereby."

All this is, no doubt, entirely obvious or entirely irrelevant. It is obvious when we take the standpoint to which Avenarius invites us. It is irrelevant to the considerations that ensue from the so-called epistemological position. But if I may use proper names for the sake of convenience, if Avenarius is irrelevant to Locke, Locke is irrelevant to Avenarius, and if, for the sake of satisfying curiosity, we take the spectator's view-point, epistemology will have to become part of the spectacle in order to be considered at all. As such it provides an entertainment altogether unique.

Thinking, then, comes after indecision and because of it, and before decision and for the sake of it. The contrast is not that which is inferred to exist between supposed states of mind, however confident and assured, and an assumed reality to which these states of mind refer. The contrast is between an observed state of affairs become ambiguous for someone seriously concerned with them, and the same affairs, which are, however, no longer quite the same, since examination of them, helped by experience and ingenuity, in a word, by resourceful common sense, has found out what is to be done under the circumstances. Decision has replaced indecision,

certainty has replaced ambiguity. Shall we not say that knowledge has replaced ignorance and doubt? A situation, an affair, an object, is *empirically* ambiguous when it is *treated* as an object of doubt and uncertainty. It is *empirically* an object of knowledge when it is *treated* as sufficiently understood for the one concerned to go again about his business with it. As an object in an active person's life, a thing is empirically what it is treated as being. Our spectator of the market-place would say that his human specimens treated judgments as cases of knowledge when they treated them as bases of procedure. The issue might prove some of them wrong. Could anything else prove them wrong—or right? For when we talk of decision and confidence replacing doubt, and say that this change is brought about by a piece of work that we call thinking, we are not talking of merely emotional confidence, but of practically justified confidence; when we use the word "knowledge" we mean a judgment that some one is justified, under the circumstances, in treating as knowledge. This is where the importance of experiment appears. In a situation presenting novel features, one that does not repeat previously known situations, and can not, therefore, be identified as a member of a particular class, what can prove a judgment about it right or wrong, except trying out the judgment in practice; what can give the light on the facts that will transform an object of partial ignorance into one that can be treated as an object of knowledge, except such experiments as are feasible? In the world of real affairs, we all have to treat our doubtful situations somehow, and that treatment is inevitably an experiment upon the factors that constitute them. If there were no such thing as novelty there would be no need for ingenuity. If we did not have to deal with new combinations of circumstances, experience with past ones would suffice for the identification of whatever comes along. This attitude is, of course, very well known; it is the attitude of the dogmatic temperament to whom real inquiry is anathema. If all practical situations as they present themselves could be successfully treated by the application of precedents, there would be no opportunity for doubt, no need for inquiry, no occasion for thinking. No objects would be objects of ignorance. A certain system of judgments would be treated as justified, verified, and established. All practical situations would be treated as objects, not of ignorance, but of knowledge. This is, however, exactly the case with hosts of people. Thinking is essentially *inquiry*, it is the effort to obtain judgments that may be treated as justified bases of procedure. Inquiry is necessary because novelty is constantly intruding itself, and rendering the most careful readings of past experience insufficient.

A description like this is, of course, a description in the rough, but

it strikes me as substantially accurate, and in it, one fact stands out—this is that recollection is in the interest of anticipation, for the sake of successful anticipation. As Professor Dewey puts it "anticipation is therefore more primary than recollection; projection than summoning of the past; the prospective than the retrospective."[4]

This is, of course, instrumentalism's point of view, rather than the background of it. In the point of view itself the important and characteristic terms are novelty, perplexity, and danger, inquiry, success and failure, doubt and confidence, the prophetic aspect of things, the constant insufficiency of past experience, and the resulting experimental character of all behavior. Here ends my specific repetition of what seems to me central in Mr. Dewey's essays. Now let me try to say a few words about the background of such a position.

The background of it is a sense, and an increasing sense, of the whole transformation of society since the French Revolution. One feature of that change we call the industrial revolution. No less radical in its effects upon the imagination is the influence of quick and sure transportation, of the telegraph and the daily newspaper. The isolation that once favored authority and tradition has given way to a cosmopolitan and international state of things, where one is prepared for the novel, the unexpected, where one is familiar with the idea of seeing for one's self. We may distinguish between the old régime, the régime of stage-coaches, sailing-ships, gossip and bulletins, private messengers, restricted foreign trade, conservation of tradition, and the problem *how* knowledge is possible, and how the new régime of the telegraph, the daily newspaper, the postal union, the fast passenger ship and passenger train, physical science, democracy, socialism, and the problem how *knowledge* is possible, the problem how to get it and fruitfully apply it. The change has probably been greater than the most radical of us can imagine. Every age has its own problems and its own terminology for stating them. One of the most naïve statements I know of is made at the very beginning of Mr. Burton's little book, *The Problem of Evil.* He says: "The problem of evil exists because mankind believes in a wise and benevolent creator: It is because man, in his better moods, believes that the universe is grounded in love, that evil has demanded an explanation. Abolish God and evil needs no explanation." Here is, indeed, a problem, but is it a problem of the old régime or of the new régime? If, however, we say that the problem of evil has nothing to do with God or with metaphysicians, but is the problem of preventing poverty and ignorance and war, and that these are problems for our ablest minds to *think* about, transforming human affairs from objects

[4] *Creative Intelligence,* p. 13.

of ignorance into objects of knowledge, we are in the new régime. The orthodox problem of evil has been cited only as a very obvious instance of now antiquated problems. Current philosophy is full of dialectical variations of problems which have resulted from assumptions once naturally made, but which we now see there is no reason for making. Our attitude toward the word "nature" has changed, and this change has caused a general shifting of presuppositions. Time was when the soul must be kept free from all taint of kinship with nature,—then the mind must be a thing apart from nature;—the experiment now of the instrumentalist in viewing the mind as a part of nature is naturally disconcerting at the start.

One of the nicest things that I recall in my whole experience as a student of philosophy is the explanation with which Professor Royce closed his lectures on metaphysics, the year that I heard him expound his system of philosophy. For two semesters he had told us of things that we would never have dreamed of, unaided. It was a lovely forenoon of early June. The class was an alert, energetic, and well-fed group of Harvard boys. Royce said to us: "The purpose of this course has been to make us feel at home in the world as we imagine the Greeks to have felt at home in the world." I had not observed that the class was not at home in the world, although some members, if they understand, probably concluded that such must be the case. Not unnaturally we had heard much about the problem of knowledge, and very naturally, as it seems to me now, the experimental method was neither commended nor used. If, however, any student had said to himself late in September, "I am a stranger here, my home is elsewhere; show me the way," and had registered in Philosophy 13, or whatever it was, for him the fruits of Royce's thinking may have performed by June the instrumental service they were intended to perform. The Harvard Yard is a wonderful place in early June, and our nine was going to bat the Yale pitcher out of the box before the day was over. Of course, it was all appearance, or at least one couldn't be sure, and it was an important question to discuss.

Something like the following may have happened to each one of us. I was coming east from the Pacific coast by the Canadian Pacific Railroad, and in crossing the plains west of Winnipeg, where one sees an occasional humble dwelling with its small barn and haystack, I asked myself what kind of philosophy would have the value of education for those people. Were one to go to them as a missionary saying, "I bring you not a tradition from the times of mana and taboo, but enlightenment, the love of wisdom, and the promise of its advantages," what kind of philosophy would justify this declaration? Suppose we say to them, "Lo, we bring you the proof that

your haystack is not in reality a haystack, but your idea, which, however, you can feed to your cattle (also ideas of yours)"; or "Lo, we bring you the proof that your haystack is a real haystack and behaves itself as such even when your eye is not on it"; or "Lo, we bring you good tidings; all conflicts are reconciled in the absolute"; or "Lo, we bring you glad tidings; those sophists that tell you of the absolute are simple folk that have not read the history of philosophy." Candidly, now, why should an honest tiller of his garden, or of his wind-swept farm listen to these tidings from the world where the life of the thinker is its own reward. And yet wisdom is no less precious west of Winnipeg than east of it; and the love of wisdom is no less to be commended on the plains than on the campus. Why need a youth in felt boots handling a four-tined fork consider whether cornstalks and manure are appearance or reality. His one comfort in spreading them is that they make real fertilizer.

So hard it is in this matter to disregard the irrelevant; but when it comes to education, to handing out something called philosophy to young men and women who give their time and their substance, their faith and perhaps something of their future, in order that they may be made acquainted with the principles of intelligence, that they may be introduced to the conceptions of the new régime and emancipated from the grave-clothes of the old, then, I say, what is theoretically negligible is not irrelevant; it is relevant in the same way that bad chemistry, bad engineering, bad sociology is relevant. Let anyone try the experiment of riding for a day west of Winnipeg, or over any similar country where no one can make a living by talking, but only by making nature yield that which she otherwise would not, let him read over as he rides along the offerings of any department of philosophy and compare it with what the word "philosophy" seems there to invite—well, let us return to our spectator's viewpoint. We must not take his report out of his mouth.

In the above sketched account of thinking as a temporal activity that begins when it is called for, and ceases when its work is done, the picture is an entirely empirical one. No less empirical is the picture that any historian of human culture can draw of the transition from what I have called the old to the new régime. No doubt a great many factors, including the use of steam power referred to above, contributed to make the change profound and radical. Mr. Dewey, in the preface to his volume, *The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy,* mentions four influences, the effects of which are easily appreciated. They are, first, the conquest of the sciences by the experimental method of inquiry, second, the application of evolutionary ideas to the study of life and society, third, the examination of the history of religions and morals, and fourth, the creation of a

new science, the science of origins. Merely to mention these four lines of modern information is to call attention to the new explanation of many so-called philosophical problems. The result is that a host of problems can be shown to be problems about what can not, by modern principles of evidence, be shown to exist, but the existence of the problems is completely accounted for by giving them their location in the history of tradition. To read the history of philosophy as history, to recognize in the philosopher's intellectual make-up a natural expression of his time and place, has been like reading the history of art as history or the history of religion as history. The old data suddenly present themselves in a new light, *viz.*, the historical light, with the result that what is being taught up and down the world as philosophy is seen to be to a considerable extent the analysis of dialectical implications of antiquated assumptions inherited from the past as so much professional capital.

This is why Professor Dewey has given us those historical essays and historical introductions. The history of philosophy is literally like the history of a pathological case. We understand the disease by laying bare its genesis. The disease will be recognized by all under the name "epistemology." But I promised not to become entangled in what is irrelevant to the instrumentalist or empirical position. Yet for one who sees that a great part of what is taught under a name that once signified the cult of intelligence has become the debating of antequated and artificial problems, frequently under the pressure of an interest in apologetics, and who understands how this has come about, for such a one who sees the What and understands the How, what is the need most evident to the disillusioned, the emancipated, the modern and scientific philosopher? Is it not the need of a recovery of philosophy? This is, in fact, the title of Professor Dewey's article which opens the new volume called *Creative Intelligence* and which contains a series of papers by a group of instrumentalists. I should like to notice the contents of this volume, but that would require more time than we have. I must quote, however, a line or two from the end of Professor Dewey's article. He points out that English, French, and German philosophy, when either of them has been marked by earnest sincerity and vitality, has been a response to English, French, or German needs, and that if philosophy in America is to show vitality and power it must be a response to "America's own needs, and its own implicit principle of successful action." And, he continues, "This need and principle, I am convinced, is the necessity of a deliberate control of policies by the method of intelligence, an intelligence which is not the faculty of intellect honored in textbooks and neglected elsewhere. . . . Our life has no background of sanctified categories upon which we may

fall back; we rely upon precedent and authority only to our undoing. . . . Faith in the power of intelligence to imagine a future which is the projection of the desirable in the present, and to invent the instrumentalities of its realization is our salvation." The intelligence that contrives ingeniously and steadily in the interest of conceived and intended good that has to be wrought out of data presented in constantly novel combinations is what is meant by the title *Creative Intelligence.*

From this passage, and from plenty of others in Professor Dewey's writings, it is clear that a factor in the background of his philosophy is the importance of radically improving our social and political conditions. Is it or is it not the business of philosophy to promote the efficacy of intelligence in dealing with the most important of subject-matters? And what does the state of the world suggest as the most important subject at the present time? But if the state of society is so disappointing, it is because collective intelligence is of so low an order. The work of raising it belongs to education. It should teach us to learn from experience all that we can learn, and to be resourceful in the presence of novelty. The first chapter of *Democracy and Education* and the little book *How We Think,* a book, in the main, for teachers, shows the bearing of problems of education upon the particular formulation and emphasis that instrumentalism has received.

Very noticeable in the background of instrumentalism is the influence of the Socratic philosophy, specifically the maxim "Know thyself" and to the identification of virtue and wisdom, as well as Aristotle's proposition that man is a political animal and his statement about the *polis,* that it came into existence to protect life, but that it has been maintained to make life good.

The above outlined point of view has not, of course, come all at once, and the form of statement it receives is bound to vary with the type of problem in which the instrumentalist is most directly interested. There is much in the work of Avenarius that anticipates the instrumentalist position, and in my own case it was this writer who prepared me to receive the doctrine here discussed. Ernst Mach, also, by his so-called principle of economy, took a frankly instrumentalist point of view. Avenarius, however, wrote from the point of view of physiological psychology, Mach from that of the investigator in physics, while Dewey's primary concern is with human values, *i.e.,* with ethics and education.

And now for a consideration that will be to many more interesting than the above mentioned considerations and which can be considered apart from them. How are we to understand the enterprise that the *Essays in Experimental Logic* represent? Whether my

interpretation of them will meet with their author's approval I do not know.

A very important theme in the history of human intelligence is the history of the organon. The first specific formulation of it that we possess is the logic of Aristotle, but what Aristotle has here brought together was, no doubt, prepared in the studies of the professors of political oratory and debate and of moral and political philosophy, and of the principles of legislation adopted by those whom the Greeks called their wise men. In the days before the printing press, in a direct democracy, unlike our indirect one, the technique of debate, of exposition of one's own programme, and of analysis of a rival programme to show its mischievous consequences, was of primary importance. Pericles was no doubt a master of it. Here was an organon of exposition and of criticism, an organon of debate that could be formulated systematically as what we call formal logic. It was no less available as an organon of teaching, exposition, demonstration, and as such it satisfied the needs of the so-called Middle Ages. With the seventeenth century begin, however, repeated attempts to formulate an organon of inquiry. The mind must learn to conduct itself aright in the search for new data and new knowledge. The problem of method has repeatedly come to the front because logic, as it has thus far been successfully formulated, is the technique of explaining what is already known, or of identifying the given as a case of what is already understood. It has grown to be the higher mathematics of the "If-Then" relation. The phrase reducing the unknown to the known, as it has been commonly understood, contradicts the idea of any revision of a point of view. To become known is to be identified under some label already in use. Logic, as thus far understood, applies a system of authoritative judgments. It can not revise or reform that system of judgments. Actually, however, all systems of judgments that are used by living people in their relations with the space and time world are constantly undergoing revision, because such use is a constant testing in the great laboratory of the world. It is experimental procedure, conscious and systematized, or unconscious and without method, that alone modifies a point of view and deals with what is new as new, and particularly is this the case when we do not simply stumble upon the new, but go looking and hunting for it. The very ideas of progress, of emancipation, of liberty, call for an organon of the empirical and experimental point of view. Now, we can not, I think, take the *Essays in Experimental Logic* as the organon so seriously needed, but I think we may take them as the *prolegomena* of such an organon. They are in any case a contribution to the history of the organon. If instead of calling his book *Essays in Experimental*

Logic the author had called it something like *Problems Connected with the Organon of Progressive Inquiry,* a good many readers might be less perplexed.

This is only an outline of one very important contribution to the philosophy that we are beginning to possess. What shines through the transformation is a great change in our sentiments about nature,—a change *from* the medieval attitude, negative, ignorant, and pessimistic, *to* a modern one, positive, constructive, and scientific. As Santayana put it "to live by science calls for faith and courage, but not to live by it is folly." What deserves our honest faith except what we find by our best efforts to be real and effective? And how can we do anything at all for human progress unless we take our view of the facts from science? It is the passing of the supernatural and the emancipation of philosophy—perhaps the greatest event in its entire history.

I hope the impression these remarks have made is not a merely negative impression. When one is engaged in clearing away débris, which, however picturesque and delightful, nevertheless clutters the path of progress, it is hard not to make an impression of rejoicing in mere destruction, like a Teutonic invasion.

But let me remind you, by way of example, of what they are doing in France as part of their preparedness for the future. They have realized that the health and happiness of the working people is of fundamental importance in the economic competition that will come. In Limoges and in Marseilles many blocks of old tenements covering acres of land have been torn down to be replaced by modern conditions of light and air and water supply. Now, in this destruction of old houses, some charming bits left over from the Middle Ages may have gone with the rest. Those that love the past more than the future may lament over the destruction of the old city blocks and narrow and unsanitary streets, and no one shares this regret, where fragments of beauty have been sacrificed, more than I do. Yet it is, after all, a sacrifice to human happiness, a sacrifice to the future of France and all that means. But what I have been advocating is less negative than this, because when we discover that the faiths of religions are not realities for science or for philosophy, but symbols for poetry, we have not lost them, we possess them as poetry, they do not possess us. After all, things are for man, man is not for things, ideas are for man, the gods are for man, man is not for them. When Voltaire (I think it was) said that God has created man in his own image and man has returned the compliment, he simply inverted the order of events. And when man's imagination wrought the conceptions of Olympian Zeus, of Apollo, of Esclepios, it made ideals articulate, as when the old painters of Italy depicted

the splendid young St. George rescuing a lovely lady, or St. Martin giving half of his cloak to a beggar, or martyrs blissfully enduring decapitation for their masters' sakes.

So our theory of scientific technique needs to be supplemented with a theory of the significant and creative imagination, a power not to be clipped and mutilated, but trained to make its great contribution of poetry and art, to the life of humanity in time.

WENDELL T. BUSH.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Emergent Evolution. The Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of St. Andrews in the year 1922. C. LLOYD MORGAN. New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1923. Pp. viii + 313.

It was inevitable that the theory of emergence as made familiar to us by S. Alexander in his *Space, Time, and Deity,* and the theory of levels worked out in America by Professor Spaulding in his *New Rationalism* and by Professor Sellars in his *Evolutionary Naturalism* should sooner or later become the basis of a new attempt to interpret the whole evolutionary programme. It is certainly most fortunate that this work should be undertaken by a biologist and psychologist of international reputation.

It is decidedly heartening that so many biologists are entering the field of constructive philosophy. The present book reminds one of other recent books and articles written by biologists showing impatience with the old mechanistic Darwinian description of a narrow range of vital events and substituting therefor an attempt to get some explanation of the whole evolutionary programme. One interesting attempt of this kind is Professor William Patten's recent book entitled *The Grand Strategy of Evolution*—a work far more daring than the present book and, I should say, equally logical and convincing. If there is anything disappointing in Mr. Morgan's book, it is not in the application of the emergent theory to the whole evolutionary process, but rather in his attempt to graft the emergent theory on to his Spinozism and then to unite the whole with a very respectable form of theism. There are striking suggestions in the book of a way in which the first and third of these could be united—but the second seems to me not to fit.

The argument of the book proceeds somewhat as follows: Evolution is the pyramidal supervening of new emergent qualities in progressively ascending grades. Life emerges from matter and mind from life. The world has been successively enriched through the advent of new qualities at the successive levels. So we have

a series of natural systems—matter systems, life-matter systems, mind-life-matter systems. At the successive levels no new "forces" appear, no new "agencies," no "entelechies"—only new kinds of *relatedness*. New terms get into new relations, and from these new relations new qualities emerge. "What is supervenient at any emergent stage of evolutionary progress is a new kind of relatedness." New "qualities" appear as an outcome of *intrinsic* relatedness, and new "properties" as an outcome of new *extrinsic* relatedness; that is, "the higher entities are not only different in themselves but they act and react differently in presence of others."

At each stage of evolution the course of events is different by virtue of the new entities that have appeared. The new relatedness is therefore "effective." "When it is present, some change in the existing go of events occurs, which would not occur if it were absent." So against the behaviorists the author urges that the presence of mind counts for progress, and things happen which would not happen if mind were absent. In living organisms, physico-chemical events are always *involved*, but there is more in such organisms than can adequately be accounted for in terms of physics and chemistry. Hence the notion of a pyramid with ascending levels. "Near its base is a swarm of atoms with relational structure and the quality we may call atomicity. Above this level, atoms combine to form new units, the distinguishing quality of which is molecularity; higher up, on one line of advance, are, let us say, crystals wherein atoms and molecules are grouped in new relations of which the expression is crystalline form; on another line of advance are organisms with a different kind of natural relations which give the quality of vitality; yet higher, a new kind of natural relatedness supervenes and to its expression the word 'mentality' may, under safeguard from journalistic abuse, be applied" (p. 35).

Now all this is very fine, but it is just a bit self-evident. I can not see how the most confirmed disciple of naturalism could object to this, nor even the zealous behaviorist; for I suppose a behaviorist would cheerfully admit that when simple elements get into a new relatedness, things happen which would not happen were it not for the new relatedness; nor that as a result of this new relatedness qualities arise which are new; nor even that certain of these qualities might be included under the term "mind."

In fact, it has seemed to me that this doctine of emergence might afford a platform on which several opposing schools could get together. Differences between vitalists, idealists, and "naturalists" begin to get smoothed down as soon as we all see that when elements get into new forms of relatedness, entities arise which are new,

unique, and effective. A convoluted brain is in evolution something new, unique, and effective, from its new relatedness new powers and capacities arising; and it would seem quite proper to call these new powers and capacities mind. Both life and mind would then be something new, unique, and effective.

But now we open a new chapter in Mr. Morgan's book and the trouble begins. What causes the emergents to emerge? This is the ancient and insurgent problem of the moving cause. Any system of constructive evolutionary philosophy seems to need an "evolutionary urge," an "organizing principle," a "nisus," an "*élan*," a "struggle for existence," or even just a plain God. When we have a go of events, what makes them go? Mr. Alexander had the happy thought of digging down to a level below matter, to a kind of Space-Time subway, and then considering Time as the energizing factor—a kind of cosmic *gendarme*, who says, "Circulez, Messieurs." This sounds new and different. But when he goes on to say that Time is to Space what soul is to body, it seems like the old familiar doctrine of the world-soul; and we recall that Mr. Hobhouse says in the preface to the second edition of his *Mind in Evolution* that he has come to the conclusion that mind in some form is the essential driving force in all evolution. But, Mr. Morgan prefers to call it God, although he designates it equally often as mind or activity. But the Activity is directive and purposeful, accepted "under acknowledgment," that is, as a creed not, perhaps, susceptible of logical proof.

Now when Mr. Morgan raises the question *how* this Activity, this Mind, this God serves as the nisus or spring of evolution, he takes us into a profound discussion of causation, which shows a familiarity with philosophical concepts most unusual in a zoölogist or even a comparative psychologist. In the end he distinguishes between causation, whether of the transeunt or immanent kind, and Causality implying a relation of Dependence. Emergent evolution *involves* a series of natural causes—it *depends on* God, Causality *sub specie æternitatis*. This seems rather metaphysical for these days and I like better the sentiment of another paragraph which I find in the middle of the book:

"Within us, if anywhere, we must feel the urge, or however it be named, which shall afford the basis upon which acknowledgment of Activity is founded. What then does it feel like? Each must answer for himself, fully realizing that he may misinterpret the evidence. Without denying a felt push from the lower levels of one's being—a so-called driving force welling up from below—to me it feels like a drawing upwards through Activity existent at a higher level than that to which I have attained."

If we consider mind as "an emergent quality at an approximately definable stage of evolutionary advance, and then consider that there is also a directive planful Mind, either as the driving force or drawing power actualizing the whole movement, this would seem to make the Universe as full of mind as it ought to be. But Mr. Morgan is not satisfied even with this. He must take lessons of Spinoza and thinks that mind is also a universal correlate of all physical being; and he interprets Mr. Alexander's Space-Time, in which Time is the soul and Space the body, as really meaning that there is a fundamental Spinozistic duality in this, an inner and outer aspect, a correlation, as our author prefers to say.

Thus it comes out, as he explicitly says, that he uses the word "mind" in three senses: First, Mind or Spirit in reference to some Activity, for us, God; Secondly, as a quality emergent at a high level of evolutionary advance; and thirdly, as a psychical attribute that pervades all natural events in universal correlation.

Now I do not see any need for bringing in this dual-aspect theory. It is at best a mystical notion, for which Mr. Morgan would have to lean even more heavily upon his "acknowledgment," or "natural piety"; and it seems to me to add nothing to the system, which appears quite complete and admirable without it. Why not start, not with a psycho-physical system, but with a physical system, in which mind emerges at an advanced stage in the evolutionary programme, and in which we must recognize some driving force or drawing power, such as that which our author calls Activity, God, or Mind. If Mr. Morgan finds the theory of correlates useful later on in discussing memory and revival, it is perhaps because he has not himself fully realized the potentialities of his emergent principle. Mr. Morgan objects to applying to this moving cause any such word as *Élan* or Entelechy, working from without, from some disparate order of being, an "alien influx into nature"; for God is in all and works within. But I do not know why the believer in *Élan* or Entelechy might not say that these work from within, and that Mr. Morgan's God is "an alien influx into nature."

Mr. Morgan discusses the theory of knowledge and has a keen chapter on the new light thrown upon it by the theory of relativity. He does not like the extreme neo-realists, but favors a kind of phenomenalism, accepting as objective a world of purely physical events and systems of things having both intrinsic and extrinsic relatedness, giving real qualities and properties. But this realism does not go very far, for the author with his *projicient* and *ejicient reference* finds the world that we know very phenomenalistic after all. He does not follow Mr. Alexander (perhaps unfortunately) in

saying that mind is limited to mind*ing* and does not include the mind*ed*.

Alexander's lead is gratefully followed throughout this interesting and important book, but in the completed system there are sharp divergences from that set forth in *Space, Time and Deity*. For instance, the author does not care to follow Mr. Alexander down to the Space-Time level of reality and consider matter as emergent from that. He is content to begin with a world of physical events and trace it up through its gradually enriched emergent stages—even to deity.

It seems to me that this notion of "selective synthesis," or emergent evolution, as Mr. Morgan now prefers to call it, "with new properties at critical turning points" is one of the large contributions to the philosophy of our time. If so, this book, applying the principle to the whole evolutionary process, is of first importance. It is not surprising, therefore, that Mr. Morgan, in an appendix to his book, entitled "Evolutionary Naturalism," in which he discusses the points of agreement and difference between Professor Sellars and himself, rather proudly calls attention to the fact that he developed this thought in the year 1894 in a chapter in his book on "Comparative Psychology." Under the name of "creative synthesis" the principle was set forth by Wundt, as is well known, but I do not recall that it was used by him earlier than 1896, when he published his *Grundriss der Psychologie*.

G. T. W. PATRICK.

THE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA.

Bergson's Doctrine of Intuition. A. A. LUCE. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. New York: Macmillan Co. 1922. Pp. 122.

Un Pseudonyme Bergsonien? FIRMIN NICOLARDOT. Paris: Librairie philosophique Vrin. 1923. Pp. viii + 242.

Dr. Luce commences his lectures with the words: "The philosophy of M. Bergson has within the last thirty years aroused a world-wide interest. Its influence appears to be steadily growing both in Europe and America. It is the 'live wire' in contemporary philosophy." The short volume, aiming "to offer a sympathetic presentation of the salient features of Bergson's thought," is sufficiently described in these words. It is a clear and popular exposition, better than most of its kind; but of background, of critical temper, of philosophic significance, it possesses nothing. Dr. Nicolardot plays the philosophic Sherlock Holmes. Having in a provincial bookshop come across an old volume entitled *L'Univers, la force et la vie,* by a pseudonymous A. Laggrond, he was struck by its re-

semblance to Bergson's ideas. His book is the elaborate and painstakingly clever attempt to track down M. Laggrond and convict him of identity with M. Bergson. He concludes that if Bergson is not the author of *L'Univers,* he ought to have been. Perhaps M. Bergson will now 'fess up, for by Dr. Nicolardot's account he has not really committed such a crime.

J. H. RANDALL, JR.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

La Philosophie Constructive. EDME TASSY. Paris: E. Chiron. 1922. Pp. 324.

Positivism, though it has accomplished much for the advance of human knowledge, no longer corresponds to the stage which the evolution of thought has now reached. The same methods that were applicable to the relations between phenomena can not fruitfully be applied when those phenomena are analyzed into their elements, because the complex can not be explained by the simple, nor does a single element act or possess value except when associated with others. The time has come when science can not be content with mere relations between facts; it must discover the causes of these facts, in the complex relationships between the elements of which they are formed. These relations will form a natural basis upon which the individual sciences can be erected. Thus will "constructivism" arise on the foundation of positivism.

M. Tassy is to be the Comte of the new order. It is true that only here and there are there any evidences of the "constructive spirit"; but the evolution of thought will raise M. Tassy on high. Though his book contains an extraordinary amount of abstract reasoning and a dearth of illustrative detail, there are some interesting points here and there; his intentions are generous in the extreme. Most of the faults of the positive philosophy are in evidence in this latest attempt to organize human knowledge; it remains to be seen whether any of its virtues will emerge from their places of present concealment.

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Of What Use Are Common People? HEINRICH E. BUCHHOLZ. Baltimore: Warwick & York. 1923. Pp. vii + 251.

This bizarre but pungent title is prologue to a long and dull apology for mediocrity. The author has apparently been stirred to a near-combative attitude by the attacks, some real, some imagined, which he sees being made on democracy. Despite its dullness and verbosity, the book contains some good ideas, for any one who has the

patience to sift them out. "The bull's-eye of democracy," the author concludes, "is a government in which the interests of all the people are pooled so as to create a community of interests, and, in turn, the acceptance of this community of interests as a touchstone by which to test all governmental activities." This fundamental purpose, he thinks, is now endangered by the "breaking up into groups that disagree concerning the aims and purposes and even powers of government." Putting the thought in terms of social coöperation instead of government, he has here a thought to which many others have given attention. But his book comes a long way from establishing that the "common people," with their content in conventional mediocrity, can remedy the disorganization characteristic of to-day. Consequently, we are left somewhat in the dark as to just what use the common people are. But there can be no doubt that they, each and all, can give a pointed answer to the question. Meanwhile the author would have saved his time and ours, had he condensed his book into a 25-page article.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. XLVIII[ème] Année. Nos. 11 et 12. Quelques mots sur l'idée de limite mathématique, considérée du point de vue psychologique: *Ph. Chaslin.* L'expérimentation statistique et les probabilités: *M. Halbwachs.* La vocation de Descartes: *G. Cantecor.* La psychologie de Freud: *L. Cellerier.* Les théories contemporaines de la souveraineté: M. Hauriou et la doctrine de l'institution: *G. Davy.*

REVISTA DE FILOSOFÍA. Año IX. No. 6. La desilusión de amor: *José Ingenieros.* La faz definitiva de la sociología de Spengler: *Ernesto Quesada.* Las matemáticas y la realidad: *Carlos Dieulefait.* Los tipos de inspiración: *Rodolfo Senet.* La psicología, las ciencias sociales y el derecho: *Alberto Palcos.* A Einstein desde la biología: *Gaspar Martín.* El problema del dolor: *Aníbal Ponce.*

JOURNAL DE PSYCHOLOGIE. XX[e] Année, No. 8. Quelques remarques sur la question des éléments psychologiques et sur le problème de la volonté: *R. Souček.* Recherche d'une acuité visuelle "spécifique": *M. Landolt.* Les variations de l'irritabilité sympathique: *M. Laignel-Lavastine.* Le syndrome d'illusion des sosies: *G. Halberstadt.* Problèmes de psychologie sociale: *G. Davy.*

JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. Vol. VI, No. 6. Sex Characteristics of Systolic Blood Pressure Behavior: *W. M. Marston.*

The Cardio-Pneumo-Psychogram in Deception: *J. A. Larson.* The Influence of Constitutional Factors on Behavior: *S. Naccarati* and *H. F. Garrett.* The Effects of Underlearning upon Short- and Long-Time Retentions: *E. C. Tolman.*

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Champness, Ernest F.: The Significance of Life. A Short Study in Theism. Introduction by John W. Graham. London: The Swarthmore Press, Ltd. 92 pp. 2/.

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Lloyd, Alfred H.: The Time of Day. Reprinted from *Scientific Monthly,* Vol. XVII, Nos. 5 and 6. 28 pp.

Santayana, George: The Unknowable. (The Herbert Spencer Lecture delivered at Oxford, October 24, 1923) New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch. 29 pp. $.70.

Wohlgemuth, A.: A Critical Examination of Psycho-Analysis. New York: Macmillan Co. 1923. 250 pp.

Taylor, Henry Osborn: Freedom of the Mind in History. New York and London: Macmillan Co. 1923. xii + 297 pp. $2.25.

NOTES AND NEWS

The programme of the Twenty-third Meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, which will be held at Brown University, Providence, R. I., on December 27, 28, and 29, is as follows:

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 27.

8:00 p.m.

Smoker at the Hotel Biltmore.

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 28.

9:30 a.m.

Science and Philosophy	*Jesse H. Holmes.*
Perception and Thought	*George Plimpton Adams.*
Act, Content, and Object	*W. Curtis Swabey.*
The Nature of Objective Reference	*William Savery.*

2:00 p.m.

An Essential Factor in Every Truly Radical Empiricism	*Mary Whiton Calkins.*
A Crucial Argument in Idealism	*Charles H. Toll.*
The Nature of Value	*R. W. Sellars.*

4:30–6:00 p.m.

Reception by Professor and Mrs. Everett at the Brown University Faculty Club.

7:00 p.m.

Annual Dinner at the Hotel Biltmore.

Welcome by President Faunce.

The President's Address: The Einstein Theory and a Possible Alternative — *W. P. Montague.*

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 29.

9:30 a.m.

Nature, Reason, and Romance — *Morris R. Cohen.*
The Anguish of Philosophy — *George W. Peckham.*
Maurice Blondel's Philosophy of Action — *Katherine E. Gilbert.*
Business Meeting.

The programme of the Thirty-Second Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association, which will be held at the University of Wisconsin on December 27, 28, and 29, has been received. It contains the schedule of the meetings, the programme to be given at each meeting, and a short abstract of each of the papers to be read.

On Thursday, there will be two sessions on General Psychology in the morning and two sessions on Experimental Psychology in the afternoon, one following the other. There will be an Exhibition of Apparatus and Test Materials at five o'clock, and in the evening will be held the annual business meeting.

On Friday morning a Session for Informal Reports by Graduate Students and a Session on Industrial Psychology will be held simultaneously. In the afternoon a programme devoted to Social and Racial Psychology will be followed by a Symposium on "The Contributions of Freudianism to Psychology." In the evening will be held the annual dinner. Professor Lewis M. Terman will deliver the presidential address.

On Saturday morning there will be a business meeting of the Section of Clinical Psychology, and a Session on Mental Measurement, followed by a Session on Clinical and Educational Psychology. There will also be held a Conference of Experimentalists.

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